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Ultimately, the success of any trade relationship depends
on achieving satisfactory levels of trust and confidence
among trade partners. Uncertainty in such relationships
has increased with the adoption of World Trade Organiza-
tion [WTO] regionalization criteria. An important, and
often overlooked, aspect of these criteria governing inva-
sive species regulation is the degree of confidence and trust
among regulatory agencies to conduct pest risk assess-
ments, monitor changing conditions, and enforce stan-
dards (Thornsbury & Romano, 2002). 
One policy response has been increased use of a sys-
tems approach; multi-step sanitary and phytosanitary reg-
ulations designed to reduce pest risks (USDA APHIS,
2002).1 We rely on an ongoing case to illustrate attempts
to alleviate uncertainty and the complexity of negotiations
over policies to manage invasive species risk.2 Specifically,
we examine efforts by Argentina to gain access to U.S.
lemon markets illustrating 
• how private/public partnerships can build institutions
in developing countries to increase the likelihood of
access to new markets;
• linkages between institution building and increased
trust between trade partners; and 
• pressures from industries at home. 
Pests of Concern
Argentina is currently the largest lemon producer in the
world with approximately 30% of global production
(more than 1 million metric tons a year) and a large
exporter (more than 330,000 metric tons annually),
mainly to European countries (Figure 1). Despite gaining
entry to Europe and Japan, Argentine lemons are banned
from U.S. markets. In the 1960s, Argentina was only a
modest lemon producer with most orchards concentrated
in the humid Northeastern states, where the plant disease
citrus canker is prevalent. Concern over inadvertent trans-
fer of citrus canker was a primary reason for the original
U.S. ban on Argentine citrus (USDA APHIS, 1998b).3
Citrus canker is a highly contagious bacterial disease
that causes leaf loss, premature fruit drop, and lesions on
leaves, stems, and fruit. It is endemic in some major citrus-
producing regions of the world (i.e., Brazil), but is gener-
ally considered manageable for fruit that will be further
processed. The canker alters exterior appearance with a
major impact on fresh fruit sales. 
1. An example includes a requirement to test for pathogen 
presence (step 1) and mandatory pesticide application 
(step 2), regardless of the outcome of step 1. These measures 
are independent and risk reduction is additive: if there is a 
failure in step 1 (the test is negative when in fact a patho-
gen is present), then there is not an automatic failure in 
step 2 (USDA APHIS, 2002). Such practices are applied 
to fresh avocado imports from Mexico into the United 
States (e.g., Orden & Romano, 1996). 
2. There are many other examples of disputes over such poli-
cies. For example, in 2005, USDA identified 41 trade 
issues involving potential impediments to U.S. horticul-
tural exports (USDA FAS, 2005). In addition, 33 com-
plaints were raised in the WTO Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Committee between 1995 and 2002 regarding 
policies governing trade in horticultural products (Roberts 
& Krissoff, 2004). 
3. Other pests of concern were later identified by APHIS 
(fruit flies, sweet orange scab, and citrus black spot).144 CHOICES 3rd Quarter 2006 • 21(3)
In the early 1990s, a group of
Argentine businessmen hoping to
expand exports planted substantial
citrus acreage in four Northwest
Argentina states free of citrus canker.
In 1991, citrus producers, processors,
and exporters in this area established
the Phytosanitary Association of
Northwest Argentina (called AFI-
NOA), a grower-sponsored institu-
tion with a goal of fostering coopera-
tion to implement sanitary and
phytosanitary [SPS] practices that
would help promote citrus exports.
The investors’ plan was to apply
modern technologies to produce fruit
targeted towards European and
American markets. 
A Challenge to Argentine 
Institutions
In 1993 Argentina requested entry
for fresh grapefruit, lemons, and
oranges from the Northwest area to
the United States. In 1994, a group
of U.S. Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service [APHIS] patholo-
gists visited to assess conditions. Pre-
liminary results indicated that,
although the region appeared to be
canker-free, it did contain citrus
black spot and sweet orange scab,
two citrus fungal diseases not present
in the United States. In 1995, APHIS
denied the request for entry unless
canker-free status could be docu-
mented and treatments for the other
two diseases approved (Harlan Land
Co. v. USDA, 2001).4
The Argentine regulatory agency
was neither willing nor able to satisfy
U.S. concerns and the process stalled
in a political dispute. The U.S. posi-
tion requested scientific evidence of
pest-free status. The Argentine posi-
tion stated that, since European
Union-approved policy allowed cit-
rus imports from Northeastern pest-
free orchards located in nonpest-free
states, the risk of transferring disease
from regions deemed pest-free had to
be negligible. The Argentine position
failed to acknowledge the myriad of
different elements and conditions
that influence species invasion across
geographic areas, as well as different
risk preferences and thresholds
among potential importers. This
illustrates how difficult it is for regu-
lators in a developing country to
understand the importance of follow-
ing established sanitary protocols and
to demonstrate scientifically proven
phytosanitary health. 
To some extent, this controversy
underscores the differences in Ameri-
can and European approaches to
invasive species management. While
APHIS followed the WTO’s region-
alization principle to allow imports
from certified pest-free regions,
Europe followed protocols based only
on identification of pest-free orchards
(FVO, 2002). Momentum to break
the impasse came from the Argentine
grower organization AFINOA. This
group enlisted the academic commu-
nity to provide scientific expertise to
satisfy the requests from APHIS. In
addition, the grower organization
gathered political support from the
Governors of Northwest Argentina to
improve and document phytosani-
tary measures insuring separation of
products from pest-free regions. To
address U.S. concerns over institu-
tional uncertainty, the Government
of Argentina began to elevate the sta-
tus of its regulatory and enforcement
4. The United States was not canker-
free at this time since the plant dis-
ease had been detected in the 
Miami-Dade County, Florida area 
during 1995. An aggressive eradi-
cation program was underway, and 
avoidance of additional pest entry 
was considered critical to success. 
The U.S. eradication program 
included quarantine restrictions on 

















Figure 1. Destination of Argentine lemon exports, 2001. Year 2001 was cho-
sen to show U.S. participation. For years other than 2001, exports to the U.S.
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agencies, developing a new institu-
tional umbrella (National Agrifood
Health and Quality Service, or
SENASA in Spanish). 
Subsequently APHIS, given the
scientific surveys and research results
in 1996, in turn issued a supplemen-
tal pest risk assessment, which esti-
mated that the median chance for
establishment of pests of concern in
the United States was negligible (1 in
3.2 million). In August 1998, APHIS
published a proposed rule that
allowed citrus imports using a sys-
tems approach to guard against black
spot and sweet orange scab (USDA
APHIS, 1998a). Included were safe-
guards at the grove and post-harvest
levels, a phytosanitary certificate,
cold treatment, disease detection pro-
tocols, and limitations on distribu-
tion and repackaging. Responding to
the need to understand and accom-
modate APHIS’ requirements,
Argentina was able to move the pro-
cess forward despite initial mistrust.
As a result, the dispute evolved into a
less-trade-restrictive protocol based
on multiple safeguards built into the
systems approach.
Still, increased trust among regu-
latory agencies had not been trans-
ferred to U.S. growers and public
comments to the proposed rule
revealed continued opposition. Con-
cerns were raised about the scientific
basis and execution of the systems
approach. Meanwhile, regulatory
officials were confident in the scien-
tific merits of the proposal and
APHIS moved forward with other
aspects of the process. In late 1998,
an economic analysis determined
that the rule “[would] not have a sig-
nificant economic impact on a sub-
stantial number of small entities”
(USDA APHIS, 2000). An environ-
mental assessment was published,
which concluded there was negligible
environmental risk but if the systems
approach failed, the subsequent envi-
ronmental impact would be “consid-
erable” (USDA APHIS, 1998b). 
Despite institutional confidence,
domestic industry concerns led U.S.
officials to be cautious in rule-mak-
ing. Argentine officials eventually
complained about unnecessary delays
and APHIS published a final ruling
on June 15, 2000, which allowed
immediate entry (Magalhães, 2001;
USDA APHIS, 2000). Regardless,
opposition in the United States con-
tinued as growers questioned the
ability of trade partner institutions to
adequately monitor and carry-out the
steps of the systems approach. Legis-
lative representatives from California
threatened APHIS with a withhold-
ing of fiscal year 2001 funding until
after a review of the Argentine citrus
rule and associated risk assessment
were commissioned (NAWG, 2000;
Costa, 2000). 
To address grower concerns,
APHIS personnel conducted an
unannounced review in March 2001.
Regulatory officials visited SENASA
offices to verify the presence of suffi-
cient technical personnel, examine
agency records, and visit a laboratory.
Throughout the review, APHIS did
not discover any irregularities or vio-
lations and, despite strong continued
opposition from California, lemon
trade continued.
A Challenge to U.S. Institutions
On March 30, 2001, California and
Arizona citrus growers filed a lawsuit
directly challenging APHIS’ scientific
procedures and asking that the final
rule be overturned (Harlan Land Co.
v. USDA, 2001). Complainants
argued that the final rule was unlaw-
ful because of its inconsistency with
the Plant Quarantine Act of 1912.
On May 12, 2001, arguments were
An Extract of the Court Ruling
 1. “Having reviewed the Risk Assessment, the court concludes that the final 
rule is arbitrary and capricious because it is based on a faulty risk assessment. 
The uncertain nature of the Risk Assessment is illustrated by the fact that the 
risk of citrus black spot introduction increased significantly under the revised 
Risk Assessment from one chance in 3.2 million to one chance in 763,000 for 
the mean and from one chance in 840,000 to one chance in 189,000 for the 95 
percentile. Although the risk is still lower than the risk of fruit fly introduction, 
where there is one chance in 350,000 for the mean and one chance in 93,000 
for the 95 percentile value, the fact that there was a four-and-a-half fold 
increase in the risk of citrus black spot introduction at the 95 percentile 
because of faulty assumptions made by the APHIS scientists suggests that 
APHIS needs to reevaluate the Risk Assessment.”
2. “Although the Risk Assessment take (sic) human error into content (sic), it 
may have understated human error in light of SENASA’s failure to report the 
foot-and-mouth disease. Frankly, the court is concern (sic) about whether 
SENASA can be entrusted to enforce the mitigation measures used by the sys-
tems approach.”
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS SO ORDERED that plaintiffs be granted summary judgment 
and defendants be denied summary judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that 
the Argentine citrus rule is suspended until a new rule is in place. The final rule 
is remanded to APHIS to address the concerns raised by the court.”
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heard in an Eastern District of Cali-
fornia court. Institutional uncer-
tainty surrounding both APHIS and
SENASA was raised as prosecutors
argued that the risk assessment was
confusing and internally inconsis-
tent. Further concerns were reliance
on a foreign regulatory institution
(SENASA) to implement, verify, and
enforce part of the systems approach
since, in the recent past, this institu-
tion had concealed an outbreak of
foot-and-mouth disease for several
months. The distrust of California
growers for international regulatory
officials had been extended to
include domestic scientists and regu-
lators. The court ruled in favor of the
prosecution and entry of Argentine
lemons was again banned as of Sep-
tember 29, 2001. 
The Story Continues
With imports to the United States
halted, Argentina announced in Feb-
ruary 2002 that citrus canker had
been detected in the Northwest
states. Continued discussions
between the two countries postponed
an official APHIS site visit until the
week of March 10, 2003. The goal
was to demonstrate that, despite the
loss of canker-free status, systems
approach safeguards were rigorous
enough to meet phytosanitary stan-
dards. This argument was not funda-
mentally different than that posited
by Argentina in the 1990s. By 2003,
however, the Argentine claim had
been strengthened by additional sci-
entific and institutional evidence.
Based on results of the visit, APHIS
formally recognized the appropriate-
ness of the systems approach in place,
but criticized the Argentine govern-
ment for not implementing a canker
eradication program (Wager-Page et
al., 2003). Growers and policymakers
in Argentina rejected the demand for
such a program and the process
remained stalled.
A new development in this story
took place in January 10, 2006, when
USDA officials declared defeat in
their own canker eradication process
announcing that Florida hurricanes
had “so widely distributed [the dis-
ease] that eradication is infeasible”
(Conner, 2006). There is a sense
among Argentine officials that this
announcement may induce APHIS
to abandon the request for an eradi-
cation program in Northwest Argen-
tina and instead develop a new proto-
col along the lines of the systems
approach policies currently in place
for Europe and Japan. In early 2006,
a group of APHIS and SENASA offi-
cials met to further discuss the issue
(Enright, 2006).
Lessons Learned
The Argentine lemon case reveals
important lessons regarding trust and
confidence among trade partners and
the difficulties involved in decreas-
ing institutional uncertainty. There is
a demonstrated need for developing
countries seeking access to interna-
tional markets to organize and estab-
lish strategies based on scientific evi-
dence and enforcement programs.
Sanitary and phytosanitary policies
based on multiple safeguards appear
to be a valid tool to decrease regula-
tory uncertainty while achieving a
reduction in pest risk, allowing trade
partners to build mutual trust and
confidence. 
Phytosanitary measures must be
consistently enforced over time by
the exporting country to reduce dis-
trust from the importing country;
however, the regulatory agency in the
exporting country is not the sole
place where such uncertainty may
arise. The dynamics of the lemon
case shifted attention to credibility of
domestic, as well as foreign, institu-
tions. In this case, while trust and
confidence between regulatory agen-
cies has been slowly building, the
same cannot be said for the industries
involved. Although institutional and
scientific adjustments in the develop-
ing country were crucial to build
mutual trust and facilitate advance-
ment of the regulatory process, some
adjustments are still needed to over-
come political pressures at home and
abroad. 
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank David
Orden, Everett Peterson, and three
anonymous reviewers for helpful
comments and suggestions. This
research was supported by the Pro-
gram of Research on the Economics
of Invasive Species Management
(PREISM), Economic Research Ser-
vice, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, under Cooperative Agreement
43-3AEM-3-80087.
For More Information
Conner, C. (2006). Letter to Charles 
H. Bronson, Florida Commis-




Costa, J. (2000). Importation of 
Argentine Citrus. Bill Number: 
SJR 38. Adopted in Senate on 






Enright, C. (2006). Letter to Carlos 
Horacio Casamiquela, Vice-Presi-
dent Servicio Nacional de Sanidad 
y Calidad Agroalimentaria 
(SENASA), January 27.  Docu-
ment retrieved from the Embassy 3rd Quarter 2006 • 21(3) CHOICES 147
of Argentina, Washington, DC, 
in March 2006.
Food and Veterinary Office [FVO]. 
(2002). Final Report of a Mission 
Carried out in Argentina from 10-
14 September 2001 in Order to 
Evaluate the Inspection Procedures 
for Citrus Fruit Originating in 
Argentina and Exported to the 
European Union. European Com-
mission - Directorate-General 
Health and Protection of the 
Consumers. DG (SANCO)/





Harlan Land Co. v. USDA. (2001). 
Court Ruling. Eastern District of 




Magalhães, J. (2001). Sanitary and 
phytosanitary issues and the SPS 
Agreement. Presented at China/
FAO Citrus Symposium, Beijing, 
China. Available online: http://
www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/
X6732E/x6732e13.htm.
National Association of Wheat 
Growers [NAWG]. (2000). 
NAWG joins opposition to citrus 
limits. NAWG newsletter. Avail-
able online: http://www.small-
grains.org/dtnfiles/081100.htm.
Orden, D., & Romano, E. (1996). 
The Avocado Dispute and Other 
Technical Barriers to Agricultural 
Trade Under NAFTA. Presented 
at NAFTA and Agriculture: Is the 
Experiment Working? San Anto-
nio, TX. 
Roberts D. & Krissoff, B. (2004). 
Regulatory Barriers in Interna-
tional Horticultural Markets, 
(WRS-04-01). Washington 
D.C.: USDA Economic Research 
Service. Available online: http://
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/
WRS04/jan04/wrs0401/. 
Thornsbury, S., & Romano, E. 
(2002). Scientific Capacity and 
Institutional Adjustments for Stan-
dard Development. Presented at 
Free Trade of the Americas, the 
WTO, and New Farm Legisla-
tion, San Antonio, TX.
United States Department of Agri-
culture [USDA APHIS]. 
(1998a). Importation of Grape-
fruit, Lemons, and Oranges from 
Argentina. Proposed Rule. Fed-
eral Register 63(155): 43117-
43125.
United States Department of Agri-
culture [USDA APHIS]. 
(1998b). Proposed Rule for Impor-
tation of Grapefruit, Lemons, and 
Oranges from Argentina, Environ-




United States Department of Agri-
culture [USDA APHIS]. (2000). 
Importation of Grapefruit, Lem-
ons, and Oranges from Argen-
tina. Final Rule. Federal Register 
65(116): 37608-37669.
United States Department of Agri-
culture [USDA APHIS]. (2002). 
The Role and Application of the 
Systems Approach. A Scientific 
Review coordinated by The 




United States Department of Agri-
culture [USDA FAS]. (2005). 
FAS Guide to World Horticultural 
Foreign Agricultural Trade: U.S. 
Specialty Crops Trade Issues. (Cir-
cular Series FHORT 1-05) Wash-
ington D.C.: Foreign 




Wager-Page, S.,Van Dersal, J.M., 
Robertson, S., Demarino, Y., & 
Gaskalla R. (2003). Trip Report. 
Site Review of Northwest Region 
Proposed for Citrus Exports from 
Argentina. March 9-14. Docu-
ment retrieved from the Embassy 
of Argentina, Washington, DC, 
in March 2006.
Eduardo Romano (romano@pire.org)
is Associate Research Scientist, Pacific
Institute for Research and Evaluation
(PIRE), Calverton, MD. Suzanne
Thornsbury (thornsbu@msu.edu) is
Assistant Professor, Department of
Agricultural Economics, Michigan
State University, East Lansing, MI.
Senior authorship is shared.148 CHOICES 3rd Quarter 2006 • 21(3)